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SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE - MEMORY *
T HE common legal assumptions in regard to memory come
most clearly to the surface in the rules governing present
recollection revived, past recollection recorded, and cross-examina-
tion to impeach. Between the first two, sharp distinctions are
drawn which result partly from the fact that a memorandum used
to refresh recollection generally does not go to the jury as evi-
dence - whereas a memorandum of past recollection does - and
partly from the psychological theories of the courts. Thus a
federal judge lately remarked: 2
"It is one thing to awaken a slumbering recollection of an event, but
quite another to use a memorandum of a recollection, fresh when it was
correctly recorded, but presently beyond the power of the witness so to
restore that it will exist apart from the record. In the former case it is
quite immaterial by what means the memory is quickened; it may be a
song, or a face, or a newspaper item, or a writing of some character. It
is sufficient that by some mental operation, however mysterious, the
memory is stimulated to recall the event, for when so set in motion it
functions quite independently of the actuating cause." 3
Since when so set in motion, the memory is thought to function
quite independently of the actuating cause, it naturally follows
* This study grew out of a paper read before the Council on Remedies of the
Association of American Law Schools in December, 1926, which was followed by an
article on the general subject published last July. Hutchins, The Law and the
Psychologists (1927) 16 YALE REv. 678. Another article in 'this series appeared in
(1928) 28 COL. L. REv. 432. The series is the joint work of Mortimer J. Adler and
Jerome Michael of Columbia University and Robert M. Hutchins and Donald
Slesinger of Yale University. This article was prepared by the Yale authors with
the advice and approval of the Columbia authors. The writers acknowledge the
assistance of A. J. Russell, an honors student in Evidence at Yale.
1 Katsonas v. Sutherland Bldg. & Const. Co.; 1o4 Conn. 54, 132 Atl. 553 (1926);
Gray v. Boston Elevated Ry., 215 Mass. 143, 102 N. E. 71 (1913); Lucas v.
Metropolitan St. Ry., 56 App. Div. 405, 67 N. Y. Supp. 833 (1900). Contra: Gross
v. Scheel, 67 Neb. 223, 93 N. W. 418 (19o3) ; Croushore's Estate, 79 Pa. Super. 286
(1922) ; Nelson v. Gibson, 9o Vt. 423, 98 At. ioo6 (i9i6). See (1917) 65 U. oF
PA. L. REv. 499.
2 Dietrich, J., in Jewett v. United States, i5 F.(2d) 955 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926).
3 i5 F.(2d) at 956.
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that the nature, origin, or past history of the actuating cause is, as
Judge Dietrich suggests, immaterial. As long as the memory is
stimulated to recall the event, it makes no difference what stimu-
lates it. Thus courts of liberal tendencies no longer insist that the
memorandum should have been made by the witness or under his
direction.' And although the Supreme Court thirty years ago I
reversed a judgment because a writing was used which was not
made contemporaneously with or very close to the transaction,
most other jurisdictions, and even some federal circuits,6 do not
now require the witness to conform to any definite time require-
ment. If he will swear that his recollection is thereby refreshed he
may, in the discretion of the trial court, resort to anything from a
photograph to a press clipping, however irrelevant or ancient, to re-
fresh it.7 The rule is based on the theory that certain stimuli start
a chain of associations which, apparently, have been completely
forgotten. Although the dicta of the courts make it possible to
stimulate, say, the memory of a face by referring to a picture of
the Woolworth building, in actual practice the refreshing mem-
oranda are found to be more closely related to the thing to be re-
membered. The press clipping, in other words, describes the event
4 This is not an altogether modem view. Cf. Lord Ellenborough in Henry v.
Lee, 2 Chitty 124, 125 (1814): "And it makes no difference, that the memorandum
was written by himself, for it is not the memorandum that is the evidence, but the
recollection of the witness." One of the best recent statements is that of Wheeler,
C. J., in Neff v. Neff, o6 Conn. 273, 114 At.: 126 (1921). The other view is repre-
sented by Wellman v. Jones, 124 Ala. 580, 27 So. 416 (igoo), and Gordon & Koppel
Clothing Co. v. New York Cent. R. R., 285 S. W. 755 (Mo. App. 1926). See
(1916) 14 MIcH. L. REv. 332; (1915) 15 COL. L. REv. 468.
5 Putnam v. United States, 162 U. S. 687 (1896), followed in Chase v. United
States, 13 F.(2d) 847 (C. C. A. 6th, 1926), and Nardi v. United States, 13 F.(2d)
7Io (C. C. A. 6th, 1926), noted in (1926) 4o HARV. L. REv. 330.
6 Cf. Di Carlo v. United States, 6 F.(2d) 364 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925); Jewett v.
United States, supra note 2; Olmstead v. United States, i9 F.(2d) 842 (C. C. A.
gth, 1927) ; De Leon v. Cortes, 23 F.(2d) 636 (C. C. A. 1st, 1927) (under Porto
Rican statute); Monument Pottery Co. v. Imperial Coal Corp., 21 F.(2d) 683
(C. C. A. 3d, 1927).
7 State v. Choffe, 14o At. 404 (N. J. 1928); Sagers v. Internat. Smelting Co.,
So Utah 423, 168 Pac. 105 (1917) (memorandum made one year after event);
Hinkelman v. Pasteelnick, I3O At. 44I (N. J. 1925), noted in (2926) 24 MICH. L.
REV. 420; Commonwealth v. Ford, 130 Mass. 64 (i88I) ; Hoffman v. State, 24 Okla.
Cr. 236, 218 Pac. 176 (1923) ; Potts v. McPeters, 240 Miss. 97, 103 So. 202 (1925).
But see Titus v. Gunn, 69 N. 3. L. 410, 55 Atl. 735 (I9O3), and Detroit Life Ins.
Co. v. Linsenmier, 217 N. W. 929 (Mich. 1928).
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in question; the picture is of the person to be identified. The
stimulus is actually recognized before the associated recall starts
functioning.
When the witness cannot swear that his memory is refreshed,
however, he must overcome stricter rules as to time and authenti-
cation. If the memorandum is to be his testimony, and is to go to
the jury as past recollection recorded, he must, even in the most
progressive jurisdictions, show that it was made by him, or under
his direction, or that he knows it to be correct! Although the old
idea that the memorandum had to be practically contempora-
neous 9 with the transaction has now been almost wholly aban-
doned, a writing not made soon thereafter will have hard sledding
in the courts." Recollection is believed to grow progressively
dimmer as time goes on, finally fading out altogether."
After a witness has testified with the aid of a memorandum, or
has offered one in evidence, or even if he has done neither, his
cross-examination may center on his recollection. Here it will be
proper in the discretion of the trial judge to show that he has fre-
quently forgotten many things - that his memory is far from
good -and in particulars, too, which have no reference to the
affairs set forth in the memorandum he has employed or to the
subject of his testimony. "If it be generally deficient," says
Robinson, " the whole field of the past is open to the advocate, and
the more varied and disassociated are the topics it embraces, the
more thoroughly are his defects revealed. On the other hand, if
his memory appears generally perfect, and able to recall events
of every kind with equal ease, the cross-examiner must dis-
cover a deficiency in reference to some class of facts as yet un-
8 Norwalk v. Ireland, 68 Conn. I, 35 Atl. 804 (1896); Kolber v. Frankenthal,
159 BlI. App. 382 (19ii); Wishek v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 213 N. W. 488
(N. D. 1927).
9 Maxwell's Ex'r v. Wilkinson, 113 U. S. 656 (1885) ; Spring Garden Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Evans, I5 Md. 54 (1859).
10 See 2 WIGXORE, EvIDNaCE (2d ed. 1923) § 745; 5 CHAMBERLAYNE, MODERN
LAW or EvIDENcE (1916) § 35io. Cf. Murray & Pepper v. Dickens, 149 Ala. 240,
42 So. 1031 (19o6); Volusia County Bank v. Bigelow, 45 Fla. 638,33 So. 704 (903).
11 There is, of course, a large element of recognition in the doctrine of past
recollection recorded. The witness on the stand must identify the document as one
made by him, or under his direction. Because the errors of recognition are fully
treated in the remarks about present recollection revived, attention is here focused
on those features of the other doctrine which are designed to assure the accuracy of
the record, rather than the accuracy of the recognition of the record as authentic.
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noticed ... , 12 It is possible for a witness who has given his
recollection of the making of a sale to be cross-examined as to his
ability to remember names, faces, or the ages of his grandchildren.
If a man forgets these things, will he not forget others also? This
rule depends on the doctrine that memory is a single entity which
is either good or bad as a whole.
If we examine these rules in inverse order, we find the last one
deriving its authority from a defunct psychology, which divided
the human mind into a number of faculties," each operating as a
unit. Since memory was one of these faculties, exercise of any
part of it was thought to improve all of it. Children who practiced
learning poems by heart so developed the faculty that in later life
they would have no trouble in remembering Mr. Simms of Seattle.
The same theory was given as a reason for the retention of the
classics and mathematics in the curriculum, because the "mind"
training involved would later be transferred to all sorts of life
situations.
The application of the scientific method to educational problems
revealed the inadequacy of faculty psychology.1 4 That it did not
work in practice was confirmed by innumerable laboratory experi-
ments. The standard method of testing the transfer of training is
as follows: a subject is given a task of known difficulty to perform
in arithmetic, memorizing, puzzle solving, or what not. His abil-
ity is measured by the length of time it takes to perform the task,
or the number of errors made after a given interval. He is then
set practicing with different materials until a marked improvement
in the new work appears. After the practice period another test is
made of his ability in the original field of endeavor. Most investi-
132 ROBINSON, FORENSIC ORATORY: A MANUAL FOR ADVOCATES (1893) 193, quoted
in WIGMORE, PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL PROOF (I913) 481. "The testing of a witness's
capacity of recollection, by cross-examination upon other circumstances, even
unconnected with the case in hand, is a recognized and common method of measur-
ing the weight of his testimony." 2 WiGmORE, EVIDENCE § 995. " A witness testify-
ing to any transaction may be cross-examined ...concerning other transactions
which might be wholly immaterial, for the purpose of throwing light upon his
powers of memory. . . ." JoNSs, COMMENTARIEs ON EvIDENCE (2d ed. 1926) § 2345.
There seem to be no recent cases in which this exact point has been raised on appeal.
But countless dicta sanction what is unquestionably "a recognized and common
method" of cross-examination. It appears to be so recognized and so common that
counsel never think of objecting to it. 13 SULLY, HUMAN MIND (1892).
14 WILLIM JAMS, PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY (1890).
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gators have drawn the conclusion that there is little if any transfer
of training, 5 and that the existence of general faculties cannot be
assumed.
Specifically in the field of memory, one psychologist found that
practicing the learning of nonsense syllables in no way improved
ability to memorize prose or verse. 6 Another found that excellent
recognition ability could not be used to predict ability to recall,
and vice versa," that though intelligent people were usually good
"recallers," there was no correlation between intelligence and
recognition. 8 It further appeared that there was no correlation
between the ability to recall words and the ability to recall ideas,
or between the recognition of faces and the recognition of names.
Other studies within the fields of recall and recognition yield the
same lack of correlation. The result of this -battery of experi-
mental data has been the abandonment of the faculty theory and
the substitution therefor of a theory of special abilities which may
correlate more or less highly with each other. They are not, how-
ever, different aspects of one faculty. The new attitude is well ex-
pressed in the statement that " for psychology there is no such
thing as memory; there are only memories." "
Turning now to past recollection recorded and the psychological
theory of the fallibility of memory on which it rests, we discover
the psychologists, like the judges, emphasizing the importance of
the time between an experience and its report.2 Both agree that
as time goes on an experience is forgotten. But the enunciation of
this doctrine is of little help in any individual case without a more
exact knowledge of the conditions of learning, and the relationship
15 GATES, PSYCHOLOGY FOR STUDENTS or EDUCATION (1923) C. XV; 2 THORNDIKE,
EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY (1913) C. 12.
16 Sleight, Memory and Formal Training (I9II) 4 BRIT. J. PSYCH. 386.
17 Myers, A Comparative Study of Recognition and Recall (i914) 21 PSYCH.
REv. 442; Achilles, Experimental Studies in Recall and Recognition (i92o) A.cHaws
PSYCH. No. 44; Lee, An Experimental Study of Retention and Its Relation to
Intelligence (1925) 34 PSYCH. MONOGRAPHS No. 4. Contra: Bennett, The Correla-
tions between Different Memories (i916) i J. EXPER. PSYCH. 404; Jones and
English, Notional vs. Rote Memory (i926) 37 Am. J. PSYCH. 602.
18 Lee, supra note 17; Strong, Recognition Memory (1912) 19 PSYCH. REV. 447.
19 Achilles, supra note 17.
20 Davies, Professor Titchener's Theory of Memory and Imagination (1912)
19 PsYcH. REv. 147.
21 EBBINGHAUS, MEMORY, A CONTRIBUTION TO EXPERImENTAL PSYCHOLOGY
(I885) (Ruger's tr. 1913).
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that obtains among learning, time interval, and amount forgotten.
For instance, the psychologist distinguishes between underlearned
material and just learned, and again between material that is just
learned and that which is overlearned."2 In the first case, an
observer has not seen or heard his material often enough or long
enough to repeat it correctly immediately afterward. In the
second, the experience is continued long enough for the observer
to learn what has taken place and repeat it accurately just once.
In the third, it is learned well enough to repeat it accurately several
times. For instance, an automobile moving at a certain rate of
speed might not have been in the range of vision long enough for
the witness to have set down accurately, at once, a minute descrip-
tion of the occupant. This might have been possible had the car
been going a little more slowly, or had it passed by quickly twice
instead of only once. But again if the observer waited five, ten, or
fifteen minutes, the number of things remembered and set down
would become steadily smaller. In the first case, the description
would have been underlearned; in the second, it was learned just
well enough to make possible one accurate, immediate account of
what had been experienced. If the car were at a standstill, or if
it passed the witness six or a dozen times, always carrying the same
occupant, in the same attire, the facts would be had " by heart"1 or
overlearned.
Although the amount forgotten in any given interval of time is,
in part, dependent upon the degree of learning, the relation be-
tween the two is not constant. For instance, material that is fifty
per cent overlearned, that is, material which has been experienced
half again as many times as were necessary to just learn it, is
better retained at the end of four hours than material just learned.
But at the end of two days slightly more of the overlearned mate-
rial is forgotten than of the just learned. On the other hand,
what is underlearned is less well reproduced at the end of the
second day than what is just or overlearned. Whereas at the end
of a week differences of twenty:five or thirty per cent in the degree
of learning have little or no effect.23
22 EBBINGHAUS, op. cit. supra note 21; Luh, The Conditions of Retention (1922)
31 PsYCH. M NoGRAPHS No. 142; Tolman, The Effects of Underlearning upon Short
and Long-Term Retentions (1923) 6 J. EXPER. PSYCH. 466.
23 Luh, supra note 22; Tolman, supra note 22.
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These curious results are explained by the fact that the rate of
forgetting is not uniform. A person does not forget twice as much
in two days as he does in one, or twenty-four times as much in a
day as in an hour. The many psychologists who have measured
forgetting agree that while relatively enormous amounts are for-
gotten in the first five or ten minutes, as the time interval increases
the rate of forgetting decreases. 4 Ebbinghaus, a pioneer in the
psychology of memory, found that although over half was for-
gotten at the end of the first hour, less than three quarters had been
forgotten at the end of the second day. And after the lapse of a
month, only another five or six per cent had dropped from memory.
More recently, using a different method of measuring the amount
retained, another investigator found that a fourth of the amount
learned was forgotten in four hours, but only a little over a half
by the end of the second day. 5 These differences in the absolute
amount retained at certain times are due to the sort of material
learned and the methods of measuring what is retained. But the
differences do not alter the shape of the mathematical curve of
forgetting. In every case it starts with a sharp rise, and begins to
flatten perceptibly at the end of two or three days. On the basis
of that curve, it is safe to assume that what was not recorded for
two weeks might just as well have waited for two months, as far
as accuracy of memory is concerned. 6
In spite of this continual oblivescence, the stories we get in
documents and on the witness stand are told with a strange defi-
niteness and clarity. The recorder or witness does not usually
seem conscious that anything may be missing or, worse, inaccurate.
The reason for this lies in the peculiarities of an image. Although
occasionally an experience may be mistaken for an image, it is
generally true that images differ from reality in their greater
24 Ebbinghaus, supra note 21; Luh, supra note 22; Bean, The Curve of For-
getting (1912) ARcHivss PsYcH. No. 21.
25 Luh, supra note 22.
26 Two things may be noted here in passing. As the time interval between ex-
perience and recaU increases, not only is much forgotten, but also errors creep into
what is remembered. Dallenbach, The Relation oj Memory Error to Time Interval
(1913) 20 PsYcHr. REv. 323. And there is a direct relation between attention and
retention. What was seen out of the corner of the eye, so to speak, does not
deserve a high degree of credibility. Myers, A Study in Incidental Memory (x913)
ARcmivEs PsYCH. No, 26,
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vagueness." When an attempt is made to translate an image into
words, two things happen which make the words untrustworthy.
In the first place, there is a strong tendency to sketch in the miss-
ing details; and in the second, the words used give no indication
of the degree of definiteness of the image. A person may thus
state that "it was raining that day and I had my rubbers and
umbrella" as a memory when in reality the "raining" was an
inference from the "rubbers and umbrella" and the mental pic-
ture of the event is very hazy indeed. Once, however, the image
becomes words, it takes on all the color of the words, and becomes
retroactively clear, sharply defined, and complete. In evaluating
statements of past facts, therefore, the curve of forgetting is
doubly important.
When we pass from past recollection recorded to present recol-
lection revived, we observe that here recognition plays an impor-
tant part. 8 A glance at a paper on the witness stand, and the
"mysterious mental process" referred to by Judge Dietrich 2 -is
set in motion. That mysterious process is, in the first instance,
recognition, though it is later followed by associated recall. But
the relative position of recognition in present recollection revived
gives it psychological aspects different from those of past recol-
lection recorded. Of certain differences, as we have noted, the
courts are aware. It remains to be seen whether or not the courts
and psychologists are aware of the same differences.
The courts, in allowing recollection to be thus revived, correctly
assume that recognition s" outlasts recall; 21 they also assume cor-
rectly that a person's inability to recall is no ground for diagnosing
an equal inability to recognize. 2 On two grounds, then, they seem
27 PEAR, ZEMMBERING AxD FORGETTING (2922) 33, 38.
28 See note ii, supra. We are concerned here with the revived memory, its rela-
tion to the stimulus, and the relation both have to the objective accuracy which is
the goal of the courts. 1 29 Supra note 3.
SO It must be kept dearly in mind that the recognition is only a stimulus. The
process of recognition is first treated alone because it is a source of great error, and
because the "mysterious process" then set in motion most emphatically does not
function independently of it. It will be seen (infra p. 869) that the relationship
between the recognized stimulus and the recall is very close. The probability of
error in recognition is, therefore, crucial.
31 Luh, supra note 22; Myers, supra note 17; Strong, supra note i8; Strong
Effect of Time-Interval upon Recognition Memory (1913) 20 PSYcH. REV. 339.
32 See note 17, supra.
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safe in allowing this method of bringing to mind what has ap-
parently slipped it. The fact that recognition does not depend upon
either age or intelligence " is a further reason for being hospitable
to such testimony. Other attributes make it seem the method par
excellence of the court room. For instance, it takes only one third
the length of time -to learn material which is to be recognized rather
than recalled, and the material is retained for recognition almost
three times as long. 4
One might be a little skeptical of the accuracy of a psychological
process that is not dependent either on age or on intelligence. It
might be assumed, a priori, that such a process would have a fairly
wide margin of error, and that seems to be the case. This wide
margin results from the fact that error increases proportionately
with the increase in the similarity of the material to be recognized
to that originally seen.35 For'example, a subject is shown a half
dozen pictures of white children, and then later on is requested to
pick those pictures out of a batch of a dozen. If the extra six are
of houses, or horses, or colored adults, the accuracy may be as high
as eighty or eighty-five per cent. If, however, the unfamiliar
pictures are of other white children, the accuracy drops to fifty
per cent; and if the new group looks something like the old, the
percentage of correct choices is likely to be below twenty." Since
the usual memorandum employed in court is similar to the original,
the dangers of the rules on present recollection revived are obvious.
. The problem is complicated by the deceptive certainty of the
recognizer. This certainty is a direct function of the similarity of
the material.3 As a result it has an eccentric 38 relation to objec-
tive accuracy. Since this subjective certainty increases with the
degree of similarity, it follows that it also increases with the per-
centages of error. But when the material is identical, the ac-
curacy becomes almost one hundred per cent,39 and the subjective
33 See note 17, supra.
34 Mulhall, Experimental Studies in Recall and Recognition (19,5) 26 Am. J.
PSYCH. 2,7; Myers, supra note 17; Hollingworth, Characteristic Differences between
Recall and Recognition (1913) 24 Am. J. PSYCH. 532.
85 Feingold, Recognition and Discrimination (i915) PSYCH. MONOGRAPHS No. 78.
3r Ibid.
27 Lund, The Criteria of Confidence (1926) 37 Am. J. PSYCH. 372.
39 That is, it increases as what is shown becomes more similar to the original
transaction.
39 Feingold, supra note 35. The results of the Feingold experiment show that
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certainty becomes absolute. In other words, it is safe enough to
trust absolute subjective certainty as an indication of objective
accuracy; but anything less than absolute is no better (and it may
be worse) than complete uncertainty."
It will be objected that, although the foregoing criteria may be
interesting as far as recognition is concerned, a present refreshed
recollection is based only in part on recognition. Granting this
inaccuracy, is there any proof that recall, stimulated by that recog-
nition, and supposed to " function independently thereof," is also
inaccurate? A recent experiment answers the objection deci-
sively.41 In a class lecture the instructor made certain unequiv-
ocal statements about the results of a series of experiments. A
well-meaning, but none too thoughtful, reporter on the local stu-
dent paper printed an entirely erroneous account of the lecture.
On the routine examination at the end of the week, after the usual
questions, each student was asked to indicate on his paper whether
or not he had read the press account. Most of those who had read
it "recognized" it as accurate, and on the examination paper re-
membered what they had erroneously recognized. Those who had
not read the article reported the lecture with their customary ac-
curacy. The false stimulus here came while memory was still
fresh. Taking into consideration the fact that the recognition
curve of forgetting is a slow reproduction of the recall curve, we
readily see that a few weeks or months later the things recognized
and then recalled would be even less likely to conform to objective
reality.
In evaluating the memory of a particular person in a particular
situation, psychology has developed a number of objective tests
which the courts are reluctant to admit.4 The intelligence tests
while many errors are made when the material to be recognized is, say, eighty per
cent similar to the original, when the material is one hundred per cent similar, or is
the original shown again, error drops to almost nothing. This is natural because
the error is due to mistaking similar material for the genuine article.
40 Strong, supra note 18; Hollingworth, supra note 34.
41 Bird, The Influence of the Press upon the Accuracy of Report (1927) 22
J. ABN. AND SOC. PSYCH. 123.
42 Cf. State v. Schlaps, 254 Pac. 858 (Mont. 1927), and Strand v. State, 252
Pac. 1030 (Wyo. 1927). As to use of systolic blood pressure devices, cf. Frye
v. United States, 293 Fed. 1013 (Ct. of App. D. C. 1923), noted in (1924) 33 YALE
L. J. 771; (1925) 37 HARv. L. REV. 1138; (1924) 24 COL. L. REV. 429; (1924) 34
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which have been most widely used and are therefore the best
standardized may be admitted in evidence without hesitation.
These tests, since they have a high correlation with recall, may be
considered a rough measure of it. There are countless other tests
of memory,4" which, though not yet as thoroughly standardized as
the Stanford Revision of Binet,44 for example, have been in use
long enough to warrant their employment in the court room. It
is not suggested that every witness be subjected to an exhaustive
series of tests; but in doubtful cases they furnish valuable aid to
the discretion of the trial court.
This brings us back to cross-examination to impeach. The de-
parture for limbo of faculty psychology, taking with it the faculty
of memory, indicates that cross-examination to other instances of
forgetting, unrelated in kind to the facts of the case in suit, is a
waste of time. The control of it is now vested in the trial judge.
But his discretion should be exercised -to forbid it, not to extend it.
Indeed, the day must come when that discretion will no longer play
the present part. The common sense of a trial judge, who may not
always be experienced and gifted, cannot rank with the psycho-
logical test when it comes to probing memory and determining the
facts relevant to probe it. Meanwhile, cross-examination of mem-
ory may well be confined to facts closely similar to those it is
claimed the witness has remembered in the case at bar. "Re-
peated instances of inability to recollect give the right to doubt the
correctness of an alleged recollection of.a material fact" " only if
the instances are akin to the material fact. Inquiry into ability to
recall dissimilar items is unprofitable and misleading.
In weighing past recollection recorded, the court will be assisted
by a knowledge of circumstances surrounding the original expe-
rience. Where the event was definitely attended to 46 by an ob-
server who was determined to remember everything that hap-
pened,47 the record can be believed with little or no reservation.
A. L. R. 147. See also the excellent discussion of these and similar devices in Mc-
Cormick, Deception Tests and the Law of Evidence (1927) 15 CAI.iF. L. REV. 484.
43 WILSON AND HAKE, HOW TO MEASURE (1921); Gould, A Test for Memory
of Names and Faces (1917) I J. APPL. PsYCH. 321.
44 TERma, MEASUREMNT OF INTELLIGENCE (1916).
45 2 WIGMORE, E VDENCE § 995.
46 Myers, supra note 17.
V7 Achilles, supra note 17; Mulhall, supra note 34. The effect of determination
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In the absence of those guarantees of accuracy,48 it is necessary
first, to scrutinize very closely the length of time or number of times
the original event was "exposed" " and, secondly, the interval be-
tween the last appearance and the making of the record. There is
nothing to be gained here by such general statements as "a suffi-
cient length of time," or "at or near the event," unless these
criteria are put upon a quantitative basis.
The general theory, for instance, that time is important because
of progressive oblivescence, is meaningless without a knowledge of
the curve of forgetting. Knowledge of it indicates that those
courts have done well who have abandoned the requirement of
strict contemporaneity; for there is a difference of only six to ten
per cent between the amount forgotten by the end of the first and
the end of the fourth hours. For the same reason, if a lapse of
two days is no ground for exclusion, there is no cause for ruling
out anything recorded in less than a month."0 And since the curve
of forgetting by that time has become almost a horizontal line, it
is safe to say that what was forgotten between one and six months
would be negligible. In other words, the curve of forgetting gives
the tribunal a method of estimating the memorial accuracy of past
records.
Of present recollection revived, it can only be said that probably
the courts have been actuated in reaching the very broad rules
they have now laid down by the thought that some testimony,
though perhaps distorted, is better than none; and by the addi-
is much greater on recall than on recognition. But with the latter it is, at least, an
added guarantee.
48 Whitley, The Dependence of Learning and Recall upon Prior Mental and
Physical Condition (1924) 7 J. EXPER. PSYCH. 420. This investigation finds the
effects negative while Stratton, Retroactive Hypermnesia (1919) 26 PsYcH. REV.
474, finds that memory for events just previous to a violent emotion is keener than
for events immediately after, or events unaccompanied by any emotion.
49 There seem to be no cases where the cross-examiner had this in mind in
testing the validity of a memorandum introduced as past recollection recorded.
Where the witness does not have recourse to a memorandum, a customary method
of cross-examination centers on his opportunity to observe and the use he made of
it. Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Emfinger, 16 Ala. App. 265, 77 So. 415 ('917);
Polley v. Kansas City Oil Co., 89 Kan. 272, 131 Pac. 577 (1913); Dean v. Wabash
Ry., 229 Mo. 425, 129 S. W. 953 (29Io); Southern Ry. v. Lester, x5i Fed. 573
(C. C. A. 6th, 1907). See also 2 WiGMORE, EViDENCE § 994.
50 EBBINGHAUS, op. cit. supra note 2i; Luh, supra note 22; Bean, supra note 24;
Finkenbinder, Curve of Forgetting (913) 24 Am. J. PsYcH. 8.
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tional supposition that the jury will give due weight to the evidence
of a man who has refreshed his recollection from, say, the comic
supplement. The trial judge who lately permitted counsel to
withdraw a witness into an anteroom during his examination for
the purpose of refreshing his recollection,5 must have smiled
grimly at the thought of how little of this inspired evidence a hard-
headed jury would 'believe. It is not suggested that the courts
depart from the rule allowing refreshment of recollection in the
discretion of the judge through any means that the witness swears
is effective. It is suggested rather that that discretion be exercised
in the light of quantitative measurements instead of general no-
tions of memory. The danger that a false recognition will produce
false recall is real. 2 - But it is a danger which in extreme cases
destroys the effectiveness of the testimony with the jury, and
in other cases can be avoided by knowledge on the part of the
judge of what the percentage of error in given circumstances is
likely to be, considering the number and the minuteness of the
details.
The legal psychology of memory, then, insofar as it is a faculty
psychology is outworn, and may as easily be abandoned by the
courts as it has been by the psychologists. Insofar as it stresses
the importance of time in past recollection recorded, it is headed in
the right direction, but suffers from minor aberrations which may
be escaped through taking a little thought. Insofar as it permits
refreshment of recollection through "a song, or a face, or a news-
paper item," it is on none too solid ground, but ground which may
be made somewhat steadier through knowledge of the interaction
of recognition and recall. The present authors are aware that
common sense rules of behavior have enabled courts to dispense
justice reasonably well up to the present. They are further aware
51 State v. Henson, 290 Mo. 238, 234 S. W. 832 (292i), criticized in (1922)
20 MIcH. L. REv. 673.
52 See Morgan, The Relation Between Hearsay and Preserved Memory (1927)
40 HAv. L. Rav. 712, 717, n. 2: "Every trial lawyer will realize that it is an
unusual case in which the memory of a friendly witness is actually refreshed upon
the stand. . . . Both before and at the trial even the most honest witnesses fre-
quently deceive themselves in thinking that their narratives represent memory only,
rather than part memory and part reconstruction. It is not uncommon to hear a
witness testify that a memorandum actually refreshes his recollection . . . when it
is apparent that he is merely accepting the contents of the writing, and would be
entirely helpless without it, even after having consulted it."
OBSERVATIONS ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
that speed is an essential element and that administering a psy-
chological test to every witness would cause immeasurable and
unnecessary delays. All that is suggested is that in those cases
where common sense has little unequivocal to offer, science may
be resorted to. This suggestion is essentially that of Dean Wig-
more, who has written, "As the science of psychology progresses,
broadening its scope and enlarging its discoveries of precise truths
and methods, it will make copious contributions in this particular
field of knowledge. . . . If courts will open their minds to the
realization that science can be applied to the judgment of testi-
monial credit, regardless of the rules arising before the days of
modern science, they will readily follow a liberal practice." "
Already the psychologists have discovered much which affects
fundamental legal conceptions of memory. By careful use of their
proved results in these and other fields, we may yet build a law of




53 2 WIG oRE, EvmENcE § 99o. Compare also the statement of another author.
"To a certain extent, greater than is perhaps generally understood, each examining
counsel and every member of the court and jury is, in dealing with evidence, called
upon to act as an amateur psychologist. So regarded, the methods employed by
them must, in the light of modem knowledge, be regarded as crude, clumsy and
ineffectual. Probably the reason for this lies in the conservative persistency with
which we are carrying into the present day the methods and machinery of what
might be called the stone-age of legal evolution." 3 CHAMBERLAYNE, op. cit. supra
note 1o, § 1774.
